![]() ![]() They resolved on a “push” fixed-wing CAS system and “pull” rotary-wing system. Within this space the Marines shaped their desired unity of command. An inner circle 5-mile radius centered over Fallujah was the keyhole. The Fallujah HiDACZ went up 25,000 feet with a 15-mile radius. The CFACC acquiesced to the Marines request of unity of command, implemented by giving I MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force) a cylinder of airspace around Fallujah called a high-density airspace control zone (HiDACZ). By turning the Fallujah fight over to the Marine Corps the CFACC could focus on other areas where insurgent activity was expected to increase. The Air Force allowed that a system based on altitude deconfliction, such as at FALLUJAH I and An Najaf, would not work in a second Fallujah battle as it would be considerably more dense and intense. The CFACC and Air Force C2 officers saw the wisdom in Kling’s plan. Giving the Marines unity of command for FALLUJAH II would prevent any traffic jams caused by dual C2 setups. The Fallujah HiDACS: simplicity as key for successfully deconfliction One F–16 pilot asserted, “I would have done anything to help the Marines out down there, if it meant blowing the wings off my chest, I didn’t care.” Credit: Marine Aviation Command Even though ordered by the CAOC to not circumvent procedures, some pilots were passionate enough about this to face disciplinary action. The DASC put the pilots in contact with a FAC who put them to work prosecuting a target. Pilots, believing that a TIC (troops in contact) situation was top priority and sensing that the CAOC’s procedures were an impediment, circumvented the CAOC and contacted the Marines DASC directly. In addition there was a safety hazard in that aircraft being controlled by different control agencies were in danger of midair collisions. overhead the target of Fallujah because there was no control and we had to go from ‘Kingpin’ (CAOC callsign) to the DASC down to the FAC and it just wasn’t efficient or effective to support the GCE (ground combat element). Pilots commented on the dangers, noting that: Pilots complained that sometimes it took in excess of 20 minutes once they were overhead to get them in contact with a FAC (forward air controller). The traffic jam scenario reminiscent of the V Corps zone in OIF I now reappeared in the skies over Fallujah. ![]() The altitude separation between the two control agencies caused a split-a seam that interrupted the smooth and efficient flow of aircraft to ground units. ![]() When Fallujah erupted in April 2004, however, the Marines needed TacAir that operated above 11,500 feet for CAS, creating air control problems. This would have worked fine because the Marines helicopters, the only type aircraft they had in VIGILANT RESOLVE, rarely flew above 11,500 feet. we had a lot of coalition forces that flew with us over their and every one of them would come up to us in the CAOC and say, ‘hey listen, how can you get us to fly in the Marine sector?’ They knew that there were things happening-they could rapidly employ their ordnance on worthy targets.Īfter OIF I, C2 of aviation reverted to the CFACC (combined forces air component commander) throughout Iraq, including in the Marine AO, except below 11,500 feet where the Marines DASC had control. The senior Marine liaison officer in the CAOC (combat air operations center) recalled that: It became common for coalition TacAir in OIF I to “bingo” (a predetermined fuel remaining amount) out of the V Corps zone and go to the Marine DASC (direct air support center) after enduring a “traffic jam” of aircraft awaiting targets in the Army’s V Corps zone. Synergy between the air and ground elements was significant. The challenges of air control: avoiding traffic jams Operation Phantom Fury (Second Battle of Fallujah): Operation Phantom Fury was a joint U.S.-Iraqi offensive in November and December 2004 (Credit: USMC) ![]()
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